[Footnote 1:  Imperial Germany, by Prince Bernhard von Buelow, p. 221.]

[Footnote 2:  Ibid. p. 220.  See also Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, pp. 157-159 and 260 et seq.]

[Footnote 3:  Imperial Germany, pp. 220-221.]

[Footnote 4:  Imperial Germany, p. 219.]

[Footnote 5:  Ibid. p. 221.]

The importance of agriculture in Germany is undoubtedly great; it may be, as Buelow says, that “the value of its produce is equal to that of the produce of industry, or even surpasses it."[1] But if the demand for it were to shrink because the industrial population lost their work through a shortage of raw materials or in any other way, agriculture would also suffer.  The population at present engaged in agriculture will in times of peace buy up to the practical limits of its purchasing power, and is hardly likely, especially in the early stages of a war, to “consume a part of the products which cannot be disposed of abroad,” except in so far as they buy German goods (the production of which the declaration of the war may have seriously impeded), instead of commodities produced abroad.  But it is questionable whether they will be able to maintain their aggregate purchasing power.  Prince Buelow ignores the fact that production for the home market will be hampered by the possible non-arrival of foreign raw materials in war time; yet Germany imported raw cotton to the value of over L29,000,000 in 1913.  Her foreign purchases of hides and skins amounted to over L22,500,000 and of wool to L10,000,000.  With even a partial suspension of imports of these and similar commodities, industries dependent on foreign products must be severely hit; unemployment must increase and the purchasing power of the urban workers diminish.  The agricultural community must suffer also, and in all likelihood will not be able to take their normal share of goods off the market.  It is true, of course, that Germany buys large quantities of food-stuffs from abroad, and that home produce will be required to take their place; but they cannot be grown immediately; in the interval, industrial disorganisation must result, and before agriculture can begin to profit by the lack of foreign supplies the harm will have been done.  Moreover, agriculture must be impeded, as, owing to the size of the German Empire, the transport of troops must seriously interfere with the conveyance of goods to the larger centres of population.  It would seem, therefore, that the policy of developing German agriculture at the same time that her dependence on foreign commerce is increasing is not an effective reply to the British Navy.  The position in Germany then is that she must for the present be satisfied with a much smaller amount of imported food-stuffs and of the raw materials of industry; and that in any case, even if the industrial machine could be kept at work, there will be practically no outlet for goods