be made to heal what has long been an open sore upon the face of Europe.  People in this country are only too apt to ignore the question altogether, or at best to say, “Oh yes, of course, if the Allies win, the Serbs will get Bosnia.”  Those who talk thus have not grasped the elements of the great problem, of which Bosnia, like Serbia itself, is only one section.  The idea that to transfer Bosnia alone from Austro-Hungarian to Serbian hands would settle anything whatever, fatally ignores alike the laws of geography and those considerations of national sentiment which dominate politics in South-Eastern Europe.  In every respect Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia complement each other.  So long as there were no railways in the Balkans and Bosnia stagnated under Turkish rule, so long as the national consciousness of the Serbo-Croats slumbered or ran in purely provincial channels, the separation between coast and hinterland was possible, though even then unnatural.  But with the advent of modern economic ideas the situation radically changed.  It was above all the possession of the Dalmatian seaboard that tempted Austria to occupy Bosnia, and so conversely the acquisition of Bosnia by Serbia would at once compel the latter, willy-nilly (quite apart from all racial affinities or sentiments), to aspire to Dalmatia as well.

Geographically, it is inconceivable that to-day Dalmatia should be in different hands from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Herzegovina does actually touch the sea at two places—­for a few miles at the swampy mouth of the Narenta below Metkovie, and for a mile at Castelnuovo-Zelenika, inside the Bocche di Cattaro.  It is obvious that to allow Serbia these two outlets, while leaving their surroundings to another State, would create immediate and intolerable friction; whereas to assign the southern half of Dalmatia to Bosnia, but to leave the northern half in other hands, would be keenly resented by the Dalmatians themselves, as an outrage alike upon their national and their local traditions.

When we consider the population of Dalmatia we must apply the rival tests of history and of race.  On the grounds of historical sentiment Italy might claim Dalmatia; for its chief towns (Zara, Sebenico, Trau, Spalato, Lesina, Curzola)[1] were Venetian colonies, and not only they but even the Republic of Ragusa, which always maintained an independent existence, were saturated with Italian culture and ideals.  But on ethnical grounds Dalmatia is now overwhelmingly Slavonic.  In 1900 only 3.1 per cent of its population—­in other words, about 15,000 out of a total of 584,000—­were Italians, the remaining 97 per cent being Serbo-Croats.  The census of 1910 is even more unfavourable to the Italians, probably unduly so.  It is, of course, true that the Italian element, though numerically negligible, represents a higher percentage of the educated and cultured class; but while this would entitle Italy to demand guarantees for the maintenance of existing Italian schools and institutions, it cannot