On the other hand, we must of course remember that any extra-European territorial changes depend not merely upon the attitude of Britain and her Allies, but upon the wishes of the Dominions.  Even in the event of victory, it is still not London alone that will decide the fate of New Guinea, of Samoa, or of German South-West Africa.  The last word will probably be spoken by Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and it is improbable that any one of the three will consent to the restoration of territory which they have occupied.  It is only in the case of German colonies which border upon British Crown colonies (e.g. Togoland, Cameroon, or East Africa) that the decision will rest entirely with the European governments.  At this stage it would be absurd to suggest even the bare outlines of a settlement; but it is well to emphasize the fact that it involves not only the United Kingdom but the Dominions, and that on its solution depends the future development of the British Empire.  In other words, the war can only result in the downfall of the Empire or in the achievement of Imperial Federation and a further democratisation of the central government.

Sec.4. Nationality and the German Empire.—­Finally, there is a still graver question.  Is Germany, if defeated, to lose territory in Europe? and if so, would it be either possible or expedient to compensate her in other directions for such a loss?  The application of the principle of Nationality to the German Empire would affect its territory in three directions—­Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, and Posen.  Let us very briefly consider these three problems.

[Illustration:  THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER Boundary of France 1815-1871 and Boundary of France 1871-1914]

(1) The population of the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine is mainly German by race and language, but none the less it had become by 1870 almost entirely French in feeling, as the result of its long union with France.  The Germans, in reannexing the provinces after the war, were actuated almost equally by reasons of sentiment and strategy.  They welcomed the recovery of a section of their race which had been wrested from them by the brutal aggression of Louis XIV. and the dynastic policy of his successor; they also desired to secure their western frontier against the possible attacks of France, which, under the Third Empire, was still most emphatically an aggressive power.  In drawing the new frontier they included for purely strategic reasons a small portion of western Lorraine, round the fortress of Metz, which was admittedly as French as Champagne or Picardy.  From 1871 till 1911, Alsace-Lorraine was governed as a direct appanage of the Imperial Crown; in the latter year it received a constitution, but nothing even remotely resembling self-government.  Contrary to the expectation of most Germans, the two provinces have not become German in sentiment; indeed the unconciliatory methods