keep it in a state conformable to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say that he is industrious.  For never commend a man on account of these things which are common to all, but on account of his opinions (principles); for these are the things which belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good.  Remembering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and be content with the things which come in season.  If you see anything which you have learned and inquired about occurring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be delighted at it.  If you have laid aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling; if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hastiness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have behaved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have behaved well in another.  How much greater is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a province?  These things come to you from yourself and from the gods.  Remember this, who gives these things and to whom, and for what purpose.  If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference where you shall be happy, where you shall please God?  Are not the gods equally distant from all places?  Do they not see from all places alike that which is going on?

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Against the quarrelsome and ferocious.—­The wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it.  And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel.  See in Xenophon’s Symposium how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him.  For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man’s ruling principle.  He wished therefore for nothing else than that which was his own.  And what is this?  Not that this or that man may act according to nature, for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state conformable to nature.  For this is the object always set before him by the wise and good man.  Is it to be commander (a praetor) of an army?  No; but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle.  Is it to marry?  No; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature.  But if he would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to belong to another:  and to be instructed is this, to learn what things are a man’s own and what belongs to another.