A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 220 pages of information about A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion.

A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 220 pages of information about A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion.

Ought you not to have gained something in addition from reason, and then to have protected this with security?  And whom did you ever see building a battlement all around and encircling it with a wall?  And what doorkeeper is placed with no door to watch?  But you practise in order to be able to prove—­what?  You practise that you may not be tossed as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about from what?  Show me first what you hold, what you measure, or what you weigh; and show me the scales or the medimnus (the measure); or how long will you go on measuring the dust?  Ought you not to demonstrate those things which make men happy, which make things go on for them in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the universe?

* * * * *

About freedom.—­He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ([Greek:  hormai]) are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall into that which he would avoid ([Greek:  echchliseis aperiptotoi]).  Who then chooses to live in error?  No man.  Who chooses to live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean?  No man.  Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free.  And who chooses to live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it?  Not one.  Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and does not obtain that which he wishes?  Not one; nor then do we find any bad man free.

Further, then, answer me this question, also:  does freedom seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?  How should it not seem so?  Is it possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be mean?  It is not possible.  When then you see any man subject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a government (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be.  This is admitted also.  Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self-governing?  Certainly.  Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free.  And do not look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or sold, but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, “Master,” even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave.  And if you hear him say, “Wretch that I am, how much I suffer,” call him a slave. 

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A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.