Upton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that “there are many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes.”  The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker (Wolf).  Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his edition) that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection of the thoughts.  The reader then will find that he cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages more than once.  He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the meaning.  I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble.  Every man must judge for himself.  But I should not have translated the book, if I had not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kind require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all.

G.L.

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

Of the things which are in our power and not in our power.—­Of all the faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capable either of approving or disapproving.  How far does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power?  As far as forming a judgment about what is written and spoken.  And how far music?  As far as judging about melody.  Does either of them then contemplate itself?  By no means.  But when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell you.  And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do neither, music will not tell you.  What faculty then will tell you?  That which contemplates both itself and all other things.  And what is this faculty?  The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties:  for what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves?  Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of appearances.  What else judges of music, grammar, and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions for using them?  Nothing else.