Against those who wish to be admired.—­When a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it.  Man, what do you wish to happen to you?  I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent.  Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit?  My wish has always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher!  Who are they by whom you wish to be admired?  Are they not those of whom you are used to say that they are mad?  Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?

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On praecognitions.—­Praecognitions are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition.  For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it?  And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming?  When then does the contradiction arise?  It arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases.  When one man says, “He has done well; he is a brave man,” and another says, “Not so; but he has acted foolishly,” then the disputes arise among men.  This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig’s flesh or not holy.  You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth.  What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right?  “Certainly.”  Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done?  “I do most certainly.”  Adapt your praecognitions then to the present matter.  Here the dispute begins.  Agamemnon says, “I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father.”  Achilles says, “You ought.”  It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition of “ought” or “duty.”  Further, Agamemnon says, “Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you.”  Achilles replies, “Would you then take her whom I love?” “Yes, her whom you love.”  “Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize?” Thus the dispute begins.

What then is education?  Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not.  In our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, all with whom we live in society.  In what then should we place the good?  To what kind of things ([Greek:  ousia]) shall we adapt it?  To the things which are in our power?  Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life, and are not children and parents and country?  Who will tolerate you if you deny this?