A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 220 pages of information about A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion.

A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 220 pages of information about A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion.
so the matter of the art of living is each man’s life.  When then is my brother’s?  That again belongs to his own art; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation.  But Philosophy promises none of these.  In every circumstance I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to nature.  Whose governing part?  His in whom I am, she says.

How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me?  Bring him to me and I will tell him.  But I have nothing to say to you about his anger.

When the man who was consulting him said, I seek to know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?  Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is.  If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time:  let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen.  Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a time and so easily?  Do not expect it, even if I tell you.

* * * * *

That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of others.—­Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed?  By no means say so, but speak rather in this way:  This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him?  If you speak thus you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man?  But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him?  Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another.  Pity him rather; drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter:  “These accursed and odious fellows.”  How have you been made so wise at once? and how are you so peevish?  Why then are we angry?  Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us?  Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief.  Consider this matter thus:  you have fine clothes; your neighbor has not; you have a window; you wish to air the clothes.  The thief does not know wherein man’s good consists, but he thinks that it consist in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think.  Must he not then come and take them away?  When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? 

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A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.