Calhoun followed, defending the interests of slavery, which he called “the rights of the South,” though too weak to deliver his speech, which was read for him.  He clearly saw the issue,—­that slavery was doomed if the Union were preserved,—­and therefore welcomed war before the North should be prepared for it.  It was the South Carolinian’s last great effort in the Senate, for the hand of death was upon him.  He realized that if the South did not resist and put down agitation on the slavery question, the cause would be lost.  It was already virtually lost, since the conflict between freedom and slavery was manifestly irrepressible, and would come in spite of concessions, which only put off the evil day.

On the 11th of March Seward, of New York, now becoming prominent in the Senate, spoke, deprecating all compromise on a matter of principle, and declaring that there was a “higher law than the Constitution itself.”  He therefore would at least prevent the extension of slavery by any means in the power of Congress, on the ground of moral right, not of political expediency, undismayed by all the threats of secession.  Two weeks afterward Chase of Ohio took the same ground as Seward.  From that time Seward and Chase supplanted Webster and Clay in the confidence of the North, on all antislavery questions.

After seven months of acrimonious debate in both houses of Congress and during a session of extraordinary length, the compromise measures of Clay were substantially passed,—­a truce rather than a peace, which put off the dreadful issue for eleven years longer.  It was the best thing to do, for the South was in deadly earnest, exceedingly exasperated, and blinded.  A war in 1851 would have had uncertain issues, with such a man as Fillmore in the presidential chair, to which he had succeeded on the death of Taylor.  He was a most respectable man and of fair abilities, but not of sufficient force and character to guide the nation.  It was better to submit for a while to the Fugitive Slave Law than drive the South out of the Union, with the logical consequences of the separation.  But the abolitionists had no idea of submitting to a law which was inhuman, even to pacify the South, and the law was resisted in Boston, which again kindled the smothered flames, to the great disappointment and alarm of Clay, for he thought that his compromise bill had settled the existing difficulties.

In the meantime the health of the great pacificator began to decline.  He was forced by a threatening and distressing cough to seek the air of Cuba, which did him no good.  He was obliged to decline an invitation of the citizens of New York to address them on the affairs of the nation, but wrote a long letter instead, addressed more to the South than to the North, for he more than any other man, saw the impending dangers.  Although there was a large majority at the South in favor of Union, yet the minority had become furious, and comprised the ablest leaders, concerning whose intention such men as Seward and Chase and John P. Hale were sceptical.  In the ferment of excited passions it is not safe to calculate on men’s acting according to reason.  It is wiser to predict that they will act against reason.  Here Clay was wiser in his anxiety than the Northern statesmen generally, who thought there would be peace because it was reasonable.