and which, of course, he traced to the removal of the deposits.  Deputations of great respectability poured in upon the President from every quarter to induce him to change his policy,—­all of which he summarily and rudely dismissed.  All that these deputations could get out of him was, “Go to Nicholas Biddle; he has all the money.”  In 1834, during the second term of Jackson’s office, there were committees sent to investigate the affairs of the Bank, who were very cavalierly treated by Biddle, so that their mission failed, amid much derision.  He was not dethroned from his financial power until the United States Bank of Pennsylvania—­the style under which the United States Bank accepted a State charter in 1836, when its original national charter expired—­succumbed to the general crash in 1837.

It is now generally admitted that Jackson’s war on the Bank was violent and reckless, although it would be difficult to point out wherein his hostility exceeded constitutional limits.  The consequences were most disastrous to the immediate interests of the country, but probably not to its ultimate interests.  The substitution of “pet banks” for government deposits led to a great inflation of paper money, followed by a general mania for speculation.  When the bubble burst these banks were unable to redeem their notes in gold and silver, and suspended their payments.  Then the stringency of the money market equalled the previous inflation.  In consequence there were innumerable failures and everything fell in value,—­lands, houses, and goods.  Such was the general depression and scarcity of money that in many States it was difficult to raise money even to pay necessary taxes.  I have somewhere read that in one of the Western States the sheriffs sold at auction a good four-horse wagon for five dollars and fifty cents, two horses for four dollars, and two cows for two dollars.  The Western farmers were driven to despair.  Such was the general depression that President Van Buren was compelled in 1837 to call an extra session of Congress; nor were the difficulties removed until the celebrated Bankrupt Law was passed in 1840, chiefly through the efforts of Daniel Webster, which virtually wiped out all debts of those who chose to avail themselves of the privilege.  What a contrast was the financial state of the country at that time, to what it was when Jackson entered upon his administration!

It is not just to attribute all the commercial disasters which followed the winding up of the old United States Bank to General Jackson, and to the financial schemes of Van Buren.  It was the spirit of speculation, fostered by the inflation of paper money by irresponsible banks when the great balance-wheel was stopped, which was the direct cause.  The indirect causes of commercial disaster, however, may be attributed to Jackson’s war on the Bank.  The long fight in Congress to secure a recharter of the Bank, though unsuccessful, was dignified and statesmanlike; but