After this, no member of the cabinet dared to attempt to usurp any authority which belonged to the elected Commander-in-chief of the army and navy,—­unless it were Chase, at a later time.  As the head of the government in whom supreme Federal power was invested in time of war, Lincoln was willing and eager to consult his cabinet, but reserved his decisions and assumed all responsibilities.  He probably made mistakes, but who could have done better on the whole?  The choice of the nation was justified by results.

It is not my object in this paper to attempt to compress the political and military history of the United States during the memorable administration of Mr. Lincoln.  If one wishes to know the details he must go to the ten octavo biographical volumes of Lincoln’s private secretaries, to the huge and voluminous quarto reports of the government, to the multifarious books on the war and its actors.  I can only glance at salient points, and even here I must confine myself to those movements which are intimately connected with the agency and influence of Lincoln himself.  It is his life, and not a history of the war, that it is my business to present.  Nor has the time come for an impartial and luminous account of the greatest event of modern times.  The jealousy and dissensions of generals, the prejudices of the people both North and South, the uncertainty and inconsistency of much of the material published, and the conceit of politicians, alike prevent a history which will be satisfactory, no matter how gifted and learned may be the historian.  When all the actors of that famous tragedy, both great and small, have passed away, new light will appear, and poetry will add her charms to what is now too hideous a reality, glorious as were the achievements of heroes and statesmen.

After the Battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, won by the Confederate General Beauregard over General McDowell, against all expectation, to the dismay and indignation of the whole North,—­the result of over-confidence on the part of the Union troops, and a wretchedly mismanaged affair,—­the attention of the Federal government was mainly directed to the defence of Washington, which might have fallen into the hands of the enemy had the victors been confident and quick enough to pursue the advantage they had gained; for nothing could exceed the panic at the capital after the disastrous defeat of McDowell.  The demoralization of the Union forces was awful.  Happily, the condition of the Confederate troops was not much better.

But the country rallied after the crisis had passed.  Lincoln issued his proclamation for five hundred thousand additional men.  Congress authorized as large a loan as was needed.  The governors of the various States raised regiment after regiment, and sent them to Washington, as the way through Maryland, at first obstructed by local secessionists, was now clear, General Butler having intrenched himself at Baltimore.  Most fortunately the governor of Maryland was a Union man, and with the aid of the Northern forces had repressed the rebellious tendency in Maryland, which State afterward remained permanently in the Union, and offered no further resistance to the passage of Federal troops.  Arlington Heights in Virginia, opposite Washington, had already been fortified by General Scott; but additional defences were made, and the capital was out of danger.