When Clinton saw that no hope remained of subduing the Americans, the British government should have made peace and recognized the independence of the States.  But the obstinacy of the king of England was phenomenal, and his ministers were infatuated.  They could not reconcile themselves to the greatness of their loss.  Their hatred of the rebels was too bitter for reason to conquer.  Hitherto the contest had not been bloody nor cruel.  Few atrocities had been committed, except by the rancorous Tories, who slaughtered and burned without pity, and by the Indians who were paid by the British government.  Prisoners, on the whole, had been humanely treated by both the contending armies, although the British prison-ships of New York and their “thousand martyrs” have left a dark shadow on the annals of the time.  Neither in Boston nor New York nor Philadelphia had the inhabitants uttered loud complaints against the soldiers who had successively occupied their houses, and who had lived as comfortably and peaceably as soldiers in English garrison towns.  Some villages had been burned, but few people had been massacred.  More inhumanity was exhibited by both Greeks and Turks in the Greek Revolution in one month than by the forces engaged during the whole American war.  The prime minister of England, Lord North, was the most amiable and gentle of men.  The brothers Howe would fain have carried the olive-branch in one hand while they bore arms in the other.  It seemed to be the policy of England to do nothing which would inflame animosities, and prevent the speedy restoration of peace.  Spies of course were hanged, and traitors were shot, in accordance with the uniform rules of war.  I do not read of a bloodthirsty English general in the whole course of the war, like those Russian generals who overwhelmed the Poles; nor did the English generals seem to be really in earnest, or they would have been bolder in their operations, and would not have been contented to be shut up for two years in New York when they were not besieged.

At length Clinton saw he must do something to satisfy the government at home, and the government felt that a severer policy should be introduced into warlike operations.  Clinton perceived that he could not penetrate into New England, even if he could occupy the maritime cities.  He could not ascend the Hudson.  He could not retain New Jersey.  But the South was open to his armies, and had not been seriously invaded.

As Washington personally was not engaged in the military operations at the South, I can make only a passing allusion to them.  It is not my object to write a history of the war, but merely to sketch it so far as Washington was directly concerned.  The South was left, in the main, to defend itself against the raids which the British generals made in its defenceless territories, and these were destructive and cruel.  But Gates was sent to cope with Cornwallis and Tarleton.  Washington himself could not leave his position near New York, as he had to watch Clinton, defend the Hudson, and make journeys to Philadelphia to urge Congress to more vigorous measures.  Congress, however, was helpless and the State governments were inactive.