So soon as the designs of the British government were known, it became the aim and duty of the commander-in-chief to guard against them.  The military preparations of Congress were utterly inadequate for the crisis, in spite of the constant and urgent expostulations of Washington.  There was, as yet, 110 regular army, and the militia shamefully deserted.  There was even a prejudice against a standing army, and the militia of every State were jealous of the militia of other States.  Congress passed resolutions, and a large force was created on paper.  Popular enthusiasm was passing away in the absence of immediate dangers; so that, despite the glorious success in New Jersey, the winter of 1777 was passed gloomily, and in the spring new perils arose.  But for the negligence of General Howe, the well-planned British expedition from the North might have succeeded.  It was under the command of an able and experienced veteran, General Burgoyne.  There was apparently nothing to prevent the junction of the forces of Howe and Burgoyne but the fortress of West Point, which commanded the Hudson River.  To oppose this movement Benedict Arnold—­“the bravest of the brave,” as he was called, like Marshal Ney—­was selected, assisted by General Schuyler, a high-minded gentleman and patriot, but as a soldier more respectable than able, and Horatio Gates, a soldier of fortune, who was jealous of Washington, and who, like Lee, made great pretensions,—­both Englishmen by birth.  The spring and summer resulted in many reverses in the North, where Schuyler was unable to cope with Burgoyne; and had Howe promptly co-operated, that campaign would have been a great triumph for the British.

It was the object of Howe to deceive Washington, if possible, and hence he sent a large part of his army on board the fleet at New York, under the command of Cornwallis, as if Boston were his destination.  He intended, however, to capture Philadelphia, the seat of the “rebel Congress,” with his main force, while other troops were to co-operate with Burgoyne.  Washington, divining the intentions of Howe, with his ragged army crossed the Delaware once more, at the end of July, this time to protect Philadelphia, leaving Arnold and Schuyler to watch Burgoyne, and Putnam to defend the Hudson.  When, late in August, Howe landed his forces below Philadelphia, Washington made up his mind to risk a battle, and chose a good position on the heights near the Brandywine; but in the engagement of September 11 was defeated, through the negligence of Sullivan to guard the fords above against the overwhelming forces of Cornwallis, who was in immediate command.  Still, he rallied his army with the view of fighting again.  The battle of Germantown, October 4, resulted in American defeat and the occupation by the British of Philadelphia,—­a place desirable only for comfortable winter quarters.  When Franklin heard of it he coolly remarked that the British had not taken Philadelphia, but Philadelphia had taken them, since seventeen thousand veterans were here kept out of the field, when they were needed most on the banks of the Hudson, to join Burgoyne, now on his way to Lake Champlain.