Men would not enlist unless they were paid and fed, clothed and properly armed.  Had there been an overwhelming danger they probably would have rallied, as the Dutch did when they opened their dikes, or as the Greeks rallied in their late Revolution, when fortress after fortress fell into the hands of the Turks, and as the American militia did in successive localities threatened by the British,—­notably in New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, when they swarmed about Burgoyne and captured him at Saratoga.  But this was by no means the same as enlisting for a long period in a general army.

I mention these things, not to discredit the bravery and patriotism of the Revolutionary soldiers.  They made noble sacrifices and they fought gallantly, but they did not rise above local patriotism and sustain the Continental cause.  Yet at no time, even when Washington with his small army was flying before Cornwallis across New Jersey, were there grounds of despair.  There were discouragements, difficulties, and vexations; and these could be traced chiefly to the want of a strong central government.  The government was divided against itself, without money or credit,—­in short, a mere advisory board of civilians, half the time opposed to the plans of the commander-in-chief.  But when Washington had been driven beyond the Delaware, when Philadelphia, where Congress was sitting, was in danger, then dictatorial powers were virtually conferred on Washington,—­“the most unlimited authority” was the phrase used,—­and he had scope to act as he saw fit.

Washington was, it is true, at times accused of incompetency, and traitors slandered him, but Congress stood by him and the country had confidence in him; as well it might, since, while he had not gained great victories, and even perhaps had made military mistakes, he had delivered Boston, had rescued the remnant of his army from the clutches of Howe and Cornwallis, and had devoted himself by day and night to labors which should never have been demanded of him, in keeping Congress up to the mark, as well as in his arduous duties in the field,—­evincing great prudence, sagacity, watchfulness, and energy.  He had proved himself at least to be a Fabius, if he was not a Hannibal.  But a Hannibal is not possible without an army, and a steady-handed Fabius was the need of the times.  The Caesars of the world are few, and most of them have been unfaithful to their trust, but no one doubted the integrity and patriotism of Washington.  Rival generals may have disliked his austere dignity and proud self-consciousness, but the people and the soldiers adored him; and while his general policy was, and had to be, a defensive one, everybody knew that he would fight if he had any hope of success.  No one in the army was braver than he, as proved not only by his early warfare against the French and Indians, but also by his whole career after he was selected for the chief command, whenever a fair fighting opportunity was presented, as seen in the following instance.