forlorn.  So confident was Howe of crushing the only army opposed to him, that he neglected opportunities and made mistakes.  At last the remnant of Lee’s troops, commanded by Sullivan and Gates, joined Washington; but even with this reinforcement, giving him barely three thousand men, he could not face the enemy, more than double the number of his inexperienced soldiers.  The only thing to do was to put the Delaware between himself and Howe’s army.  But it was already winter, and the Delaware was full of ice.  Cornwallis, a general of great ability, felt sure that the dispirited men who still adhered to Washington could not possibly escape him; so he lingered in his march,—­a fatal confidence, for, when he arrived at the Delaware, Washington was already safely encamped on the opposite bank; nor could he pursue, since all the boats on the river for seventy miles were either destroyed or in the hands of Washington.  This successful retreat from the Hudson over the Delaware was another exhibition of high military qualities,—­caution, quick perception, and prompt action.

Washington had now the nucleus of an army and could not be dislodged by the enemy, whose force was only about double his own.  Howe was apparently satisfied with driving the American forces out of New Jersey, and, retaining his hold at certain points, sent the bulk of his army back to New York.

The aim of Washington was now to expel the British troops from New Jersey.  It was almost a forlorn hope, but he never despaired.  His condition was not more hopeless than that of William the Silent when he encountered the overwhelming armies of Spain.  Always beaten, the heroic Prince of Orange still held out when Holland was completely overrun.  But the United States were not overrun.  New England was practically safe, although the British held Newport; and all the country south of the Delaware was free from them.  The perplexities and discouragements of Washington were great indeed, while he stubbornly held the field with a beggarly makeshift for an army and sturdily continued his appeals to Congress and to the country for men, arms, and clothing; yet only New York City and New Jersey were really in the possession of the enemy.  It was one thing for England to occupy a few cities, and quite another to conquer a continent; hence Congress and the leaders of the rebellion never lost hope.  So long as there were men left in peaceable possession of their farms from Maine to Georgia, and these men accustomed to fire-arms and resolved on freedom, there was no real cause of despair.  The perplexing and discouraging things were that the men preferred the safety and comfort of their homes to the dangers and hardships of the camp, and that there was no money in the treasury to pay the troops, nor credit on which to raise it.  Hence desertions, raggedness, discontent, suffering; but not despair,—­even in the breast of Washington, who realized the difficulties as none else did.