The French emperor, however, had other reasons for seeking the alliance of England in his war with Russia.  It would give him a social prestige; he would enter more easily into the family of European sovereigns; he would be called mon frere by the Queen of England, which royal name Nicholas in his disdain refused to give him.  If the Queen of England was his friend and ally, all other sovereigns must welcome him into their royal fraternity in spite of his political crimes, which were universally detested.  It is singular that England, after exhausting her resources by a war of twenty years to dethrone Napoleon I., should become the firmest ally and friend of Napoleon III., who trampled on all constitutional liberty.  But mutual interests brought them together; for when has England turned her back on her interests, or what she supposed to be her interests?

So war became inevitable.  Napoleon III. triumphed.  His co-operation with England was sincere and hearty.  Yea, so gratified and elated was he at this stroke of good fortune, that he was ready to promise anything to his ally, even to the taking a subordinate part in the war.  He would follow the dictation of the English ministers and the English generals.

It was the general opinion that the war would be short and glorious.  At first it was contemplated only to fight the Russians in Bulgaria, and prevent their march across the Balkans, and thence to Constantinople.  The war was undertaken to assist the Turks in the defence of their capital and territories.  For this a large army was not indispensable; hence the forces which were sent to Bulgaria were comparatively small.

When Nicholas discovered that he could not force his way to Constantinople over the Balkans, and had withdrawn his forces from the Danubian principalities, peace then might have been honorably declared by all parties.  France perhaps might have withdrawn from the contest, which had effected the end at first proposed.  But England not only had been entangled in the war by the French alliance, but now was resolved on taking Sebastopol, to destroy the power of Russia on the Euxine; and France was compelled to complete what she had undertaken, although she had nothing to gain beyond what she had already secured.  To the credit of Louis Napoleon, he proved a chivalrous and faithful ally, in continuing a disastrous and expensive war for the glory of France and the interests of England alone, although he made a separate peace as soon as he could do so with honor.

It is not my purpose to repeat what I have already written on the Crimean war, although the more I read and think about it the stronger is my disapproval, on both moral and political grounds, of that needless and unfortunate conflict,—­unfortunate alike to all parties concerned.  It is a marvel that it did not in the end weaken the power and prestige of both Palmerston and Napoleon III.  It strengthened the hands of both, as was foreseen by these astute