assistance of a power no longer dangerous,—­the “sick man,” whom Nicholas had resolved to crush.  Louis Napoleon cared but little for Turkey; but he did not want Constantinople to fall into the hands of the Russians, and thus make them the masters of the Black Sea.  France, it is true, had but little to gain whoever possessed Constantinople; she had no possessions or colonies in the East to protect.  But in the eye of her emperor it was necessary to amuse her by a war; and what war would be more popular than this,—­to head off Russia and avenge the march to Moscow?

Russia, moreover, was the one power which all western Europe had cause to dread.  Ever since the Empress Catherine II., the encroachments and territorial aggrandizement of this great military empire had been going on.  The Emperor Nicholas was the most powerful sovereign of the world, having a million of men under arms, ready to obey his nod, with no check whatever on his imperial will.  He had many fine qualities, which commanded esteem; but he was fitful, uncertain, ambitious, and warlike.  If an aggressive war to secure the “balance of power” could ever be justified, it would seem to have been necessary in this case.  It was an aggressive war on the part of France, since the four great Powers—­Austria, Prussia, France, and England—­were already united to keep the Czar in check, and demanded his evacuation of the Danubian provinces which he had invaded.  Nicholas, seeing this powerful combination against him, was ready to yield, and peace might have been easily secured, and thus the Crimean war been avoided; but Louis Napoleon did not want peace, and intrigued against it.

Resolved then on war, the real disturber of the peace of Europe, and goaded on by his councillors,—­the conspirators of the 2d of December, Morny, Fleury, Maupas, etc.,—­Louis Napoleon turned around to seek an ally; for France alone was not strong enough to cope with Russia.  Austria having so much to lose, did not want war, and was afraid of Nicholas.  So was Prussia.  It was the policy of both these Powers to keep on good terms with Nicholas.  It always will be the policy of Germany to avoid a war with Russia, unless supported by England and France.  The great military organization which Bismarck and Moltke effected, the immense standing army which Germany groans under, arises not from anticipated dangers on the part of France so much as from fear of Russia, although it is not the policy of German statesmen to confess it openly.  If France should unite with Russia in a relentless war, Germany would probably be crushed, unless England came to the rescue.  Germany, placed between two powerful military monarchies, is obliged to keep up its immense standing army, against its will, as a dire necessity.  It is Russia she is most anxious to conciliate.  All the speeches of Bismarck show this.