In 1888, Bismarck made a famous speech in the Reichstag to show the necessity of Prussia’s being armed.  He had no immediate fears of Russia, he said; he professed to believe that she would keep peace with Germany.  But he spoke of numerous distinct crises within forty years, when Prussia was on the verge of being drawn into a general European war, which diplomacy fortunately averted, and such as now must be warded off by being too strong for attack.  He mentioned the Crimean war in 1853, the Italian war in 1858, the Polish rebellion in 1863, the Schleswig-Holstein embroilment, which so nearly set all Europe by the ears, the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, the Luxemburg dispute in 1867, the Franco-German war of 1870, the Balkan war of 1877, the various aspects of the Eastern Question, changes of government in France, etc.,—­each of which in its time threatened the great “coalition war,” which Germany had thus far been kept out of, but which Bismarck wished to provide against for the future.

“The long and the short of it is,” said he, “that we must be as strong as we possibly can be in these days.  We have the capability of being stronger than any other nation of equal population in the world, and it would be a crime if we did not use this capability.  We must make still greater exertions than other Powers for the same ends, on account of our geographical position.  We lie in the midst of Europe.  We have at least three sides open to attack.  God has placed on one side of us the French,—­a most warlike and restless nation,—­and he has allowed the fighting tendencies of Russia to become great; so we are forced into measures which perhaps we would not otherwise make.  And the very strength for which we strive shows that we are inclined to peace; for with such a powerful machine as we wish to make the German army, no one would undertake to attack us.  We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world; and it is the fear of God which causes us to love and cherish peace.”

Such was the avowed policy of Bismarck,—­and I believe in his sincerity,—­to foster friendly relations with other nations, and to maintain peace for the interests of humanity as well as for Germany, which can be secured only by preparing for war, and with such an array of forces as to secure victory.  It was not with foreign Powers that he had the greatest difficulty, but to manage the turbulent elements of internal hostilities and jealousies, and oppose the anarchic forces of doctrinaires, visionary dreamers, clerical aggressors, and socialistic incendiaries,—­foes alike of a stable government and of ultimate progress.