So Metternich, after the marriage ceremony and its attendant festivities, foreseeing the fall of the conqueror, retired to his post at Vienna to complete his negotiations, and make his preparations for the renewal of the conflict, which he now saw was inevitable.  His work was to persuade Prussia, Russia, and the lesser Powers, of the absolute necessity of a sincere and cordial alliance to make preparations for the conflict to put down, or at least successfully to resist, the common enemy,—­the ruthless and unscrupulous disturber of the peace of Europe; not to make war, but to prepare for war in view of contingencies; and this not merely to preserve the peace of Europe, but to save themselves from ruin.  All his confidential letters to his sovereign indicate his conviction that the throne of Austria was in extreme danger of being subverted.  All his despatches to ambassadors show that affairs were extremely critical.  His policy, in general terms, was pacific; he longed for peace on a settled basis.  But his policy in the great crisis of 1811 and 1812 was warlike,—­not for immediate hostilities, but for war as soon as it would be safe to declare it.  It was his profound conviction that a lasting peace was utterly impossible so long as Napoleon reigned; and this was the conviction also of Pitt and Castlereagh of England and of the Prussian Hardenberg.

The main trouble was with Prussia.  Frederick William III. was timid, and considering the intense humiliation of his subjects and the overpowering ascendency of Napoleon, saw no hope but in submission.  He was afraid to make a move, even when urged by his ministers.  Indeed, he had in 1808 exiled the greatest of them, Stein, at the imperious demand of the French emperor,—­sending him to a Rhenish city, whence he was soon after compelled to lead a fugitive life as an outlaw.  It is true the king did not like Stein, and saw him go without regret.  He could not endure the overshadowing influence of that great man, and was offended by his brusque manners and his plain speech.  But Stein saw things as Metternich saw them, and had when prime minister devoted himself to administrative and political reforms.  Prince Hardenberg, the successor of Stein, was easily convinced of Metternich’s wisdom; for he was a patriot and an honest man, though loose in his private morals in some respects.  Metternich had an ally, too, in Schornhurst, who was remodelling the whole military system of Prussia.

The king, however, persisted in his timid policy until the Russian campaign,—­a course which, singularly enough, proved the wisest in his circumstances.  When at last the king yielded, all Prussia arose with unbounded enthusiasm to engage in the war of liberation; Prussia needed no urging when actually invaded; Austria openly threw off her conservative appearance of armed neutrality:  and the coalition for which Metternich had long been laboring, and of which he was the life and brain, became a reality.  The battle of Leipsic settled the fate of Napoleon.