scruple of enriching himself, whatever master he served; but he was not indifferent to the welfare and glory of France.  Metternich, on the other hand, abhorred the ideas of the Revolution as much as he did its passions.  He saw in absolutism the only hope of stability, the only reign of law.  He distrusted constitutional government as liable to changes, and as unduly affected by popular ideas and passions.  He served faithfully and devotedly his emperor as a sacred personage, ruling by divine right, to whom were intrusted the interests of the nation.  He was comparatively unselfish, and was prepared for any personal sacrifices for his country and his sovereign.

Metternich was treated with distinguished consideration at Paris, not only because he was the representative of the oldest and proudest sovereignty in Europe,—­still powerful in the midst of disasters,—­but also on account of his acknowledged abilities, independent attitude, and stainless private character.  All the other ambassadors at Paris were directed to act in accordance with his advice.  In 1807 he concluded the treaty of Fontainebleau, which was most favorable to Austrian interests.  He was the only man at court whom Napoleon could not browbeat or intimidate in his affected bursts of anger.  Personally, Napoleon liked him as an accomplished and agreeable gentleman; as a diplomatist and statesman the Emperor was afraid of him, knowing that the Austrian was at the bottom of all the intrigues and cabals against him.  Yet he dared not give Metternich his passports, nor did he wish to quarrel with so powerful a man, who might defeat his schemes to marry the daughter of the Austrian emperor,—­the light-headed and frivolous Marie Louise.  So Metternich remained in honor at Paris for three years, studying the character and aims of Napoleon, watching his military preparations, and preparing his own imperial master for contingencies which would probably arise; for Napoleon was then meditating the conquest of Spain, as well as the invasion of Russia, and Metternich as well as Talleyrand knew that this would be a great political blunder, diverting his armies from the preservation of the conquests he had already made, and giving to the German States the hope of shaking off their fetters at the first misfortune which should overtake him.  No man in Europe so completely fathomed the designs of Napoleon as Metternich, or so profoundly measured and accurately estimated his character.  And I here cannot forbear to quote his own language, both to show his sagacity and to reproduce the portrait he drew of Napoleon.

“He became,” says Metternich, “a great legislator and administrator, as he became a great soldier, by following out his instincts.  The turn of his mind always led him toward the positive.  He disliked vague ideas, and hated equally the dreams of visionaries and the abstractions of idealists.  He treated as nonsense everything that was not clearly and practically presented to him.  He valued only