This is of such importance that I beg leave to dwell on it; evidently our influence has not yet been exercised as it should have been, and if Mr. Lincoln now bends somewhat before counsels devoid of energy and dignity, it proceeds in part from our reserve, our silence, our apparent neutrality—­who knows? even from the discouraging language that has been sometimes held in our name.  The publication of the unlucky Morrill Tariff, (signed, we may say in passing, by Mr. Buchanan, and the revocation of which, I am convinced, will be signed some day by Mr. Lincoln,) has given the signal for political demonstrations, all of which are very far from being to the credit of Europe.  Our Moniteur has published articles to be regretted, but it is above all among the English that the cotton party has had full scope.

Let England beware! it were better for her to lose Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar, than the glorious position which her struggle against slavery and the slave trade has secured her in the esteem of nations.  Even in our age of armed frigates and rifled cannon, the chief of all powers, thank God! is moral power.  Woe to the nation that disregards it, and consents to immolate its principles to its interests!  From the beginning of the present conflict, the enemies of England, and they are numerous, have predicted that the cause of cotton will weigh heavier in her scales than the cause of justice and liberty.  They are preparing to judge her by her conduct in the American crisis.  Once more, let her beware!

And under what pretexts do we chaffer with the government of Mr. Lincoln for those energetic, persevering sympathies on which it has a right to count?  Let us examine.

We hear, in the first place, of the vigor of the South and the weakness of the North.  It is not the first time that a bad cause has shown itself more ardent, more daring, less preoccupied by consequences, than a good one.  Good causes have scruples, and every scruple is an obstacle.

I am assuredly as sorry as any one to see Mr. Lincoln struck with a sort of paralysis.  To my mind, the dangers of inactivity are considerable; I believe that it discourages friends and encourages adversaries; I believe that it sanctions more or less the baleful and erroneous principle of secession, a principle more contagious than any other; I believe, in fine, that, by postponing civil war, it probably risks increasing its gravity.  Nevertheless, shall we not take into account the exceptional difficulties with which Mr. Lincoln is surrounded?

The preceding Administration took care to leave no resource in his hands:  he found the forts either surrendered or indefensible, the arsenals invaded, the army scattered, the navy despatched to distant parts of the seas.  Is it strange that he should have yielded in some degree to the entreaties of so many able men, all urging in the same direction?  If to-morrow he should yield entirely, if he should recognize the Southern Confederacy, would it be great cause for astonishment?