It may at first sight seem that the logical course would have been to assume two years’ service in the infantry and three years’ service in the mounted arms, in accord with the German practice, but there are several reasons that appear to me to make such a proposal unnecessary.  In the first place, Great Britain’s principal weapon must always be her navy, while Germany’s principal weapon will always be her army, which guarantees the integrity of her three frontiers and also guards her against invasion from oversea.  Germany’s navy comes only in the second place in any scheme for a German war, while in any scheme for a British war the navy must come in the first place and the army in the second.

The German practice for many years was to retain the bulk of the men for three years with the colours.  It was believed by the older generation of soldiers that any reduction of this period would compromise that cohesion of the troops which is the characteristic mark of a disciplined army.  But the views of the younger men prevailed and the period has been reduced by a third.  The reduction of time has, however, placed a heavier responsibility upon the body of professional instructors.

The actual practice of the British army proves that a recruit can be fully trained and be made fit in every way to take his place in his company by a six months’ training, but in my opinion that is not sufficient preparation for war.  The recruit when thoroughly taught requires a certain amount of experience in field operations or manoeuvres.  This he would obtain during the summer immediately following upon the recruit training; for the three months of summer, or of summer and autumn, ought to be devoted almost entirely to field exercises and manoeuvres.  If the soldier is then called out for manoeuvres for a fortnight in each of four subsequent years, or for a month in each of two subsequent years, I believe that the lessons he has learned of operations in the field will thereby be refreshed, renewed, and digested, so as to give him sufficient experience and sufficient confidence in himself, in his officers, and in the system to qualify him for war at any moment during the next five or six years.  The additional three months’ manoeuvre training, beyond the mere recruit training, appears to me indispensable for an army that is to be able to take the field with effect.  But that this period should suffice, and that the whole training should be given in nine or ten months of one year, followed by annual periods of manoeuvre, involves the employment of the best methods by a body of officers steeped in the spirit of modern tactics and inspired by a general staff of the first order.