The greatest risk is due to fear—­fear in this country of what Germany may do, fear in Germany of what Great Britain may do.  Fear is a bad adviser.  There are Englishmen who seem to think that as Germany is strengthening her navy it would be wise to attack her while the British navy is superior in numerical force.  This suggestion must be frankly discussed and dealt with.

A war is a trial of strength.  To begin it does not add to your force.  Suppose for the sake of the argument that a war between England and Germany were “inevitable”—­which is equivalent to the supposition that one of the two Governments is bound to wrong the other—­one of the two Governments must take the initiative.  You take the initiative when you are the Power that wants something, in which case you naturally exert yourself to obtain it, while the adversary who merely says No to your request, acts only in resistance.  England wants nothing from Germany, so that she is not called upon for an initiative.  But the initiative, or offensive, requires the stronger force, its object being to render the other side powerless for resistance to its will.  The defensive admits of a smaller force.  A conflict between England and Germany must be primarily a naval war, and Germany’s naval forces are considerably weaker than those of England.  England has no political reason for the initiative; Germany is debarred from it by the inferiority of her navy.  If, therefore, Germany wants anything from England, she must wait to take the initiative until she has forces strong enough for the offensive.  But her forces, though not strong enough for the offensive, may be strong enough for the defensive.  If, therefore, England should take the initiative, she would in so doing give away the one advantage she has.  It may be Germany’s interest to have a prompt decision.  It can hardly be her interest to attack before she is ready.  But if she really wanted to pick a quarrel and get some advantage, it would exactly serve her purpose to be attacked at once, as that would give her the benefit of the defensive.  The English “Jingoes,” then, are false guides, bad strategists, and worse, statesmen.

Not only in the affairs of Europe, but in those of India, Egypt, and the Colonies, and in all dealings with Asia, Africa, and America the line of British policy will be the line of the British nation’s duty.

If Britain is to follow this line two conditions must be fulfilled.  She must have a leader to show the way and her people must walk in it with confidence.

The mark of a leader is the single eye.  But the traditional system gives the lead of the nation to the leader of one party chosen for his success in leading that party.  He can never have a single eye; he serves two masters.  His party requires him to keep it in office, regarding the Opposition as the enemy.  But his country requires him to guide a united nation in the fulfilment of its mission in Europe and a united Empire in the fulfilment of