That even in this extreme form the contest would be hopeless, I for one am unwilling to admit.  If Great Britain were organised for war and able to throw her whole energies into it, she might be so strong that her overthrow even by united Europe would by no means be a foregone conclusion.  But the determined preparation which would make her ready for the extreme contingency is the best and perhaps the only means of preventing its occurrence.

XI.

POLICY—­THE QUESTION OF RIGHT

I have now given reasons for my belief that in case of conflict Great Britain, owing to her lack of organisation for war, would be in a position of some peril.  She has not created for herself the means of making good by force a cause with which she may be identified but which may be disputed, and her weakness renders it improbable that she would have allies.  There remains the second question whether, in the absence of might, she would at least have right on her side.  That depends upon the nature of the quarrel.  A good cause ought to unite her own people, and only in behalf of a good cause could she expect other nations to be on her side.  From this point of view must be considered the relations between Great Britain and Germany, and in the first place the aims of German policy.

A nation of which the army consists of four million able-bodied citizens does not go to war lightly.  The German ideal, since the foundation of the Empire, has been rather that held up for Great Britain by Lord Rosebery in the words: 

“Peace secured, not by humiliation, but by preponderance.”

The first object after the defeat of France in 1870 was security, and this was sought not merely by strengthening the army and improving its training but also by obtaining the alliance of neighbouring Powers.  In the first period the attempt was made to keep on good terms, not only with Austria, but with Russia.  When in 1876 disturbances began in the Balkan Peninsula, Germany, while giving Austria her support, exerted herself to prevent a breach between Austria and Russia, and after the Russo-Turkish war acted as mediator between Russia on one side and Austria and Great Britain on the other, so that without a fresh war the European treaty of Berlin was substituted for the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano.

After 1878 Russia became estranged from Germany, whereupon Germany, in 1879, made a defensive alliance with Austria, to which at a later date Italy became a party.  This triple alliance served for a quarter of a century to maintain the peace against the danger of a Franco-Russian combination until the defeat of Russia in Manchuria and consequent collapse of Russia’s military power removed that danger.

Shortly before this event the British agreement with the French Government had been negotiated by Lord Lansdowne.  The French were very anxious to bring Morocco into the sphere of French influence, and to this the British Government saw no objection, but in the preamble to the agreement, as well as in its text, by way of declaration that Great Britain had no objection to this portion of the policy of France, words were used which might seem to imply that Great Britain had some special rights in regard to Morocco.