This is, however, only half of the answer we want.  It explains to some extent why England could find other nations co-operating with her, and reveals the general nature of the cause which they maintained in common.  But let us remember the distinction between a quarrel in which the main thing is to be in the right, and a fight in which the main thing is to win.  The explanation just sketched is a justification of England’s policy, an attempt to show that in the main she had right on her side.  That is only part of the reason why she had allies.  The other part is that she was strong and could help them.

She had three modes of action.  She used her navy to destroy the hostile navy or navies and to obtain control of the seaways.  Then she used that control partly to destroy the seaborne trade of her enemies, and partly to send armies across the sea to attack her enemies’ armies.  It was because she could employ these three modes of warfare, and because two of them were not available for other Powers, that her influence on the course of events was so great.

The question of moral justification is more or less speculative.  I have treated it here on a hypothesis which is not new, though since I propounded it many years ago it has met with little adverse criticism.  But the question of force is one of hard fact; it is fundamental.  If England had not been able to win her battles at sea and to help her allies by her war against trade and by her ubiquitous if small armies, there would have been no need for hypotheses by which to justify or explain her policy; she would have long ago lost all importance and all interest except to antiquarians.  Our object is to find out how she may now justify her existence, and enough has been said to make it clear that if she is to do that she must not only have a cause good enough to gain the sympathy of other Powers, but force enough to give them confidence in what she can do to help herself and them.

We are now ready to examine the second question, whether or no Great Britain’s position, won a century ago, is liable to challenge.

VII.

THE RISE OF GERMANY

The great event of the nineteenth century in the history of Europe is the union of Germany into a Federal State.  The secret of Prussia’s success in accomplishing that union and in leading the federation so created, has been the organisation of the national energies by a far-seeing Government, a process begun as a means of self-defence against the French domination of the period between 1806 and 1812.  The Prussian statesmen of those days were not content merely to reorganise the army on the basis of universal service.  They organised the whole nation.  They swept away an ancient system of land tenure in order to make the peasants free and prosperous.  They established a system of public education far in advance of anything possessed by any other nation.  They especially