from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused.  Justice is a word in every man’s mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification; which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still only till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up:  and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or any other.  I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this analysis at large, every time the word justice comes in his way:  but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases.  If any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be, such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect.  This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds.  But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others.

10.  And distinct and conformable ideas in Words that stand for Substances.

In the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas.  In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by.  This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth.  And though it would be well, too, if it extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected.  Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses:  and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake.  Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs:  and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to clearly understood.

11.  Third Remedy:  To apply Words to such ideas as common use has annexed them to.