what does he but lead himself and others into errors?  And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge.  And yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little, or not at all, the more knowing or orthodox:  since subtlety, in those who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue:  a virtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in their errors.

6.  Addicted to Wrangling about sounds.

Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall see that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man’s understanding.  For if the idea be not agreed on, betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about things, but names.  As often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.

7.  Instance, Bat and Bird.

Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not a question, Whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has; for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of.  But the question is, (i) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these names are supposed to stand.  And then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, combined together, they both give name bird, be all to be found in a bat:  but this is a question only of inquirers (not disputers) who neither affirm nor deny, but examine:  Or, (2) It is a question between disputants; whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is a bird.  And then the question is barely about the signification of one or both these words; in that they not having both the same complex ideas to which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another.  Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them.  For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted between them,) whether all the simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there could be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no.  And