4.  A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement of knowledge.

Thirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not,) yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge:  which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient.  These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires.  And therefore, in these, men have for the most part stopped:  but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it.  And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

5.  What things have proper Names, and why.

Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like distinctions of lace have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their discourses with them.  And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mention particular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander.  And therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:  because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight.

6.  How general Words are made.

The next thing to be considered is,—­How general words come to be made.  For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for?  Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas:  and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.  By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.

7.  Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.