CHAPTER XVIII.

Of faith and reason, and their distinct provinces.

1.  Necessary to know their boundaries.

It has been above shown, 1.  That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2.  That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3.  That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4.  That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon.  From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason:  the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world.  For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

2.  Faith and Reason, what, as contradistingushed.

I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly:  and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reason.  And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication.  This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.

3.  First, No new simple Idea can be conveyed by traditional Revelation.

First, Then I say, that no man inspired by god can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflection.  For, whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or any other signs.  Because words, by their immediate operation