3.  To make them general Signs.

But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be.  It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things:  for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. [To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a further improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences:  which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of:  those names becoming general, which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular, where the ideas they are used for are particular.]

4.  To make them signify the absence of positive Ideas.

Besides these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of some ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are Nihil in Latin, and in English, ignorance and barrenness.  All which negative or privative words cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no ideas:  for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence.

5.  Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.

It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses; v.g. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, Tranquillity, &c., are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking.  Spirit, in its primary signification, is breath; angel, a messenger:  and I doubt not but, if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which stand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first rise from sensible ideas.  By which we may give some kind of guess what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge:  whilst, to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that came not under their senses, they were