This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood.  This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.

CHAPTER IX.  OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

1.  General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence.

Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things; which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understandings,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all.  Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence:  and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or repugnancy.

2.  A threefold Knowledge of Existence.

But, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existance of things, and how we come by it.  I say, then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of god by demonstration; and of other things by sensation.

3.  Our Knowledge of our own Existence is Intuitive.

As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence.  I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain:  can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence?  If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that.  For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel:  or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt.  Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are.  In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.