Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea; as, ‘All gold is fusible.’  For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received signification?  It would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely, as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech.  What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before?  For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me.  And if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible.  Such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be.

6.  Instance, Man and Palfrey.

‘Every man is an animal, or living body,’ is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this—­That body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man:  and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing:  and so of the other—­That body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfrey; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing.  It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man:—­v.g. suppose a Roman signified by the word homo all these distinct ideas united in one subject, corporietas, SENSIBILITAS, potentia Se MOVENDI, RATIONALITAS, RISIBILITAS; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas.  Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfrey signified these ideas:—­body