an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason:  for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before.  When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge.  But in neither of these do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims.  But in the one, the things themselves afford it:  and we see the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement.  In the other, God himself affords it immediately to us:  and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity.

(3) Nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths.

They are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown truths.  Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are further advances in mathematical knowledge:  but, for the discovery of these, it was not the general maxims, ‘what is, is;’ or, ’the whole is bigger than a part,’ or the like, that helped him.  These were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions.  Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations, but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated.  This is the greatest exercise and improvement of human understanding in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims.  Would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom, no stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim, but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating it; between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced—­they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge.  Though afterwards, when schools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i.e. laid down certain propositions which were self-evident, or to be received for true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their minds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds.  Though these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm them:  and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims:  and so may any one else do, who with attention considers them.