or disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them.  And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other.  For in both the propositions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds:  and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visable to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain.  But of what use is all such truth to us?

8.  Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to things.

Though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our words signify things, the truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things.  And therefore truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for; without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence in nature.  But then it is they contain real truth, when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature:  which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

9.  Truth and Falsehood in general.

Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is.  Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is.  And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real.  The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

10.  General Propositions to be treated of more at large.

But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in propositions consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood.

I shall begin with general propositions, as those which most employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation.  General truths are most looked after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge.