Real essences.

First, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.  And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence.  This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; essential in its primary notation, signifying properly, being.  And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of particular things, without giving them any name.

Nominal Essences.

Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary signification:  and, instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species.  It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend.  But, it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus,) name stands for.  And this we shall find to be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use.

These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other nominal essence.

16.  Constant Connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.

Between the nominal essence and the name there is so near a connexion, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea whereof that name is the sign.

17.  Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essences useless.

Concerning the real essences of corporeal substances (to mention these only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions.  The one is of those who, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species.  The other and more rational opinion is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown, constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations.  The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural