it injustice.  Indeed, wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force.  For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view?  But in moral names, that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes.  But yet for all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise ideas, and trace them in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names.  If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds we make use of.

10.  Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowledge

One thing more we are to take notice of, That where God or any other law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise:  but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country.  But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nick-named ideas.

11.  Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us; and here knowledge comes short.

Thirdly, There is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real.  Such are our ideas of substances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them; by having more or different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the things themselves.  From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do, fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.

12.  So far as our complex ideas agree with those Archetypes without us, so far our Knowledge concerning Substances is real.

I say, then, that to have ideas of substances which, by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though they did never before so exist:  v.g. the ideas of sacrilege or perjury, &c., were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of any such fact.  But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed: