10.  How, by Habit, ideas of Sensation are unconsciously changed into ideas of Judgment.

Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed.  For, as itself is thought to take up no space to have no extension; so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant.  I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body.  Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them.  How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step show it another?  Secondly, we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice.  Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation.  How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark!  Men that, by custom, have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe.  And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

11.  Perception puts the difference between Animals and Vegetables.

This faculty of perception seems to me to be, that which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature.  For, however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briskly alter their figures and motions, and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in animals follows upon sensation:  yet I suppose it is all bare mechanism; and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles of moisture, or the shortening of a rope, by the affusion of water.  All which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

12.  Perception in all animals.

Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals; though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations are so few, and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals; but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made.  So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric, and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.