CHAPTER VI.

Of simple ideas of reflection.

Simple Ideas are the Operations of Mind about its other Ideas.

The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflection.

The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two:—­

Perception, or thinking; and volition, or willing.

The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties.

Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge, faith, &c., I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAPTER VII.

Of simple ideas of both sensation and reflection.

1.  Ideas of Pleasure and Pain.

There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz.  pleasure or delight, and its opposite, pain, or uneasiness; power; existence; unity mix with almost all our other Ideas.

2.  Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection:  and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain.  By pleasure and pain, I would be understood to signify, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies.  For, whether we call it; satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c., on the one side, I or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c., the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

3.  As motives of our actions.