is,—­that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered.  If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it.  This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind;—­that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before.  By this it may be tried whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection.  I would fain meet with the man who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new.  If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind that are not in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

22.  Principles not innate, because of little use or little certainty.

Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate.  I that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate.  For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them?  If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no.  Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself.  Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already:  of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.