To which let me add:  if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory; and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before; unless remembrance can be without remembrance.  For, to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before.  Without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking.  Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind was never in the mind.  Whatever idea is in the mind, is, either an actual perception, or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind that, by the memory, it can be made an actual perception again.  Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding.  Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind.  Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one’s observation.  And then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousness is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance.  For what is not either actually in view or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it had never been there.  Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had.  This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind.  I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind?  And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all.  His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de Novo, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance.  And these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark.  In this case all these ideas of colours which, when out of view, can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind.  The use I make of this