25.  These Maxims not the first known.

But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions:  which, if they were innate, they must needs be.  Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so.  When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such?  Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within?  Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings?  This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well:  and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had.  The child certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of:  that the wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for:  this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of:  but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge?  Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths?  He that will say, children join in these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.

26.  And so not innate.

Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;—­it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else.  Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts:  there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on.  Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.