Upon the whole matter, I think that our ideas, as they are considered by the mind,—­either in reference to the proper signification of their names; or in reference to the reality of things,—­may very fitly be called right or wrong ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred.  But if any one had rather call them true or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though, in propriety of speech, truth or falsehood will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition.  The ideas that are in a man’s mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong; unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together.  All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge; but when we come to refer them to anything, as to their patterns and archetypes then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Of the association of ideas.

1.  Something unreasonable in most Men.

There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men.  The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn; though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

2.  Not wholly from Self-love.

This proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great hand in it.  Men of fair minds, and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as daylight.

3.  Not from Education.

This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies.  Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself:  but yet, I think, he ought to look a little further, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

4.  A Degree of Madness found in most Men.