every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate.  When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions:  not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances.  These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them cannot refuse their assent to.

22.  Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.

If it be said, the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing (as they must who will say “that they are in the understanding before they are known,”) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,—­that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions.  And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated.  And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

23.  The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms.  Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de Novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before.  For, first, it is evident that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with them.  But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case:  the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards.  So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate.  For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate.  We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in