If it be said, that these propositions, viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “red is not blue,” &c., are not general maxims nor of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding.  For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propositions can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” they being upon this ground equal.  And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted, and assented to by the growing understanding.  And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

21.  These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.

But we have not yet done with “assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms.”  It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others.  For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any such,) they could not but be known before?  Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did?  If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before.  Whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others’ teaching than nature has made them by impression:  which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be.  This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed:  but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them.  And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle,