table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position.  This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein, though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture.  What is it, then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not?  As it is plain it does not:  for another draught made barely in imitation of this could not be called confused.  I answer, That which makes it be thought confused is, the applying it to some name to which it does no more discernibly belong than to some other:  v.g. when it is said to be the picture of a man, or Caesar, then any one with reason counts it confused; because it is not discernible in that state to belong more to the name man, or Caesar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey:  which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by man, or Caesar.  But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, had reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or Caesar; i.e. that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey; i.e. from the ideas signified by those names.  Just thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things.  No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under some ordinary name to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.

9.  Thirdly, or their simple ones mutable and undetermined.

Thirdly, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined.  Thus we may observe men who, not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language till they have learned their precise signification, change the idea they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it.  He that does this out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his idea of church, or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it up, is said to have a confused idea of idolatry or the church:  though this be still for the same reason as the former, viz. because a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name rather than another, and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for.

10.  Confusion without Reference to Names, hardly conceivable.