18.  All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.

First, That it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection:  so that all we have in our thoughts ourselves, (if we think of anything, or have any meaning,) or would signify to others, when we use words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple ideas, compared one with another.  This is so manifest in that sort called proportional, that nothing can be more.  For when a man says ‘honey is sweeter than wax,’ it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea, sweetness; which is equally true of all the rest:  though, where they are compounded, or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of:  v.g. when the word father is mentioned:  first, there is meant that particular species, or collective idea, signified by the word man; secondly, those sensible simple ideas, signified by the word generation; and, thirdly, the effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word child.  So the word friend, being taken for a man who loves and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas to the making of it up:  first, all the simple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being; secondly, the idea of love; thirdly, the idea of readiness or disposition; fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought or motion; fifthly, the idea of good, which signifies anything that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple ideas, of which the word good in general signifies any one; but, if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all.  And thus also all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas:  the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple ideas.

19.  We have ordinarily as clear a Notion of the Relation, as of the simple ideas in things on which it is founded.

Secondly, That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation as we have of those simple ideas wherein it is founded:  agreement or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all.  For, if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have, too, of equal, or more, or less, of each of these:  if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz.  Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion