agrees or disagrees with the rule; and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule:  and therefore is often called moral rectitude.  This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires.  And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in, these simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection.  For example:  let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder:  and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation, viz.  First, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, considering, purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion.  Secondly, from sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder.  This collection of simple ideas, being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious:  if I have the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver for my rule, then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty:  and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime.  So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions; or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we originally received from sense or reflection:  and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.

15.  Moral actions may be regarded wither absolutely, or as ideas of relation.

To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice of them under this two-fold consideration.  First, as they are in themselves, each made up of such a collection of simple ideas.  Thus drunkenness, or lying, signify such or such a collection of simple ideas, which I call mixed modes:  and in this sense they are as much positive absolute ideas, as the drinking of a horse, or speaking of a parrot.  Secondly, our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad; and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated,