actions:  but who would say it was the same man?  The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man:  but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself.  I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing.  And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases.  But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

18.  Consciousness alone unites actions into the same Person.

But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—­should it be to ages past—­unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment:  so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong.  Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self,—­place that self in what substance you please—­than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday.  For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—­I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

19.  Self depends on Consciousness, not on Substance.

Self is that conscious thinking thing,—­whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)—­which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.  Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so.  Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it