The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them.  Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names.  In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty.  And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase.  But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate.  The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate.  For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses.  In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas.  But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call “the use of reason.”  For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing.

16.  Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness.

A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition.  But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for.  And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same ground and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as shall be more fully shown hereafter.  So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those generic terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;—­whose terms, with the ideas