the other side, the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes not to pass.  If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing.  On the other side, if the wicked man be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable.  Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given?  I have forborne to mention anything of the certainty or probability of a future state, designing here to show the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes, upon his own principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at least possible.

73.  Recapitulation—­Liberty of indifferency.

To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which, as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter.  Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which, in short, is this:  Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs.  A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will.  That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of desire.  Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it:  because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness:  but every good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness.  For all that we desire, is only to be happy.  But, though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it.  The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man; who could not be free if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, guided by his own judgment.

74.  Active and passive power, in motions and in thinking.